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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK GRANATO, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-v-
THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
GRAND JURY, et al . , 
Defendants-Respondents, 
Case No. 14425 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE, 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL, 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS (Relating to Indictment), and 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS (Relating to Habeas Corpus) 
are as previously stated and explained in the appellant's original brief. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
A PERSON RELEASED ON BAIL HAS APPROPRIATE 
RELIEF BY HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS TO 
CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
RESTRAINT OF HIS LIBERTY. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The respondents totally rely on ancient case law to support the 
position that a person released from custody on bail is not so restrained 
of his liberty as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. Stallings v. 
Splain, 253 U.S. 339, 77 A.L.R,2d 1308 (1920). However, in Hensley v. 
Municipal Court, San Jose Milpitas J.D., Cal., 411 U.S. 345 (1973), the 
United States Supreme Court completely rejected the respondents' position 
and ruled that a person released on bail is in sufficient constructive cus-
tody to permit the application for a writ of habeas corpus. Expressly 
overruling Stallings, supra (see Hensley, footnote 8), the Court reasoned 
that although a person released on bail is not in actual physical confine-
ment, the restraint on his freedom of movement is a sufficient restraint 
of his liberty to warrant the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 
He [the accused] cannot come and go 
as he pleases. His freedom of move-
ment rests in the hands of state 
judicial officers, who may demand 
his presence at any time and without 
a moment's notice. Disobedience is 
itself a criminal offense. The 
restraint on his liberty is surely no 
less severe than the conditions 
imposed on the unattached reserve 
officer whom we held to be in cus-
tody in S t r a^^ supra. 
411 U.S. at 351. 
The Supreme Court's position in Hensley, supra, is not one 
unrecognized by other courts, but, in fact, reflects the position taken in 
the majority of state and federal jurisdictions when a person released on 
bail seeks habeas corpus as a remedy for illegal restraint. 411 U.So at 
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349 c According to the majority position, the writ of habeas corpus must 
be administered with initiative and flexibility. 
The very nature of the writ demands 
that it be administered with initiative 
and flexibility essential to insure that 
miscarriages of justice within its 
reach are surfaced and corrected. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Thus, we have consistently rejected 
interpretations of the habeas corpus 
statute that would suffocate the writ 
in stifling formalisms or hobble its 
effectiveness with the nanacles of 
arcane and scholastic procedural 
requirements. The demand for speed, 
flexibility and simplicity is clearly 
evident in our decisions concerning 
the exhaustion doctrine. (Citations 
omitted, emphasis added.) 411 U. So 
at 350. 
As the Supreme Court has "consistently rejected interpreta-
tions of the habeas corpus statute that would suffocate the writ or hobble 
its effectiveness, " it is incumbent that the Utah Supreme Court make a 
similar ruling. Rule 65B(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that habeas corpus is the proper remedy when it appears that TTany person 
is unjustly imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his liberty." (Emphasis 
added.) A reading of In re Petersen, 51 Cal. 2d 177, 331 P.2d 24, cert , 
denied, 360 U.S. 314 (1958), and Franklin v. State, 513 P.2d 1252 
(Nev. 1973) indicates the widely adopted position that a person released 
on bail may utilize the pretrial remedy of habeas corpus to challenge the 
constitutionality of the legislation restraining him or to challenge the 
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sufficiency of probable cause to hold him for t r i a l . Due to the appellant's 
attack on the constiutionality of the legislation restraining him, and due to 
his allegations of insufficiency of probable cause to hold him for trial, he 
must be afforded appropriate relief by habeas corpus proceedings. Thus, 
the tr ial court erred in dismissing the appellant's complaint for failure to 
state a claim for which relief could be granted. Any other conclusion 
would contradict the position taken by the majority of courts today, hobble 
the effectiveness of the writ of habeas corpus and would oppose the position 
taken by the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Hensley v . 
Municipal Court, supra. 
> Point II 
AFTER AN INDICTMENT 1$ RETURNED AND 
AN ACCUSED IS ARRESTED, THERE IS NO 
REASON TO DENY A REQUEST FOR VERBATIM 
COPIES OF TRANSCRIPTS OF GRAND JURY 
v > WITNESSES. 
The respondents' argument in Point II of their brief r es t s on 
the theory that the historical secrecy of grand jury proceedings warrants 
the denial of appellant's request for verbatim copies of t ranscripts of wit-
nesses who testified against him0 Relying on United States v0 Kirkland, 
5 Utah 123, 13 P. 234 (1887), respondents urge that secrecy of grand jury 
proceedings should be retained after an indictment has been returned and 
the accused has been ar res ted . The Kirkland decision perhaps reflects 
this court 's position in 1887 but does not indicate its more recent rulings 
on the question of secrecy. 
-4-
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In State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P.2d 186 (1959), the 
Utah Supreme Court came to a conclusion opposite to the respondent's 
position, wherein it was stated: 
It will be noted that after the indictment 
is returned and an accused is arrested, 
the reasons for secrecy have largely 
been spent
 0 At 187. 
The historical foundation of the respondents' argument con-
cerning the need for secrecy in the present case has crumbled in a more 
recent Utah decision, Faux, supra. Because the appellant has been 
indicted and arrested, the reasons for secrecy of grand jury proceedings 
are nonexistent, and his request for verbatim copies of witnesses' 
transcripts was improperly denied. 
Point III 
THERE IS NO REASON TO JUSTIFY THE 
LOWER COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION. 
The respondents do not deny that, according to Utah case 
law, an accused charged by information has a fundamental right to a 
preliminary examination, whereas the appellant, charged with the crime 
of bribery, was denied such fundamental right by the trial court
 0 The 
appellant was denied a preliminary hearing by the mere fact that he was 
indicted rather than charged by information
 0 There thus exists a striking 
discriminatory procedure in bringing the appellant to trial by denying 
him a fundamental right afforded all other defendants in criminal 
-5 -
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matters. Apart from the denial of a preliminary examination, the appellant 
shares the same fundamental rights enjoyed by the defendant charged by 
information; e.g0, the right to a jury trial, the right to remain silent, 
etc. The inequities apparent in bringing the appellant to trial must be cured 
unless there exists some compelling reason justifying such discriminatory 
procedural practice in this state. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); 
Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107(1966); Humphrey v. Cody, 405 U.S. 
504(1972). 
Respondents have failed to produce any reason indicating why 
a person charged by information has a pretrial right to a determination of 
probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate while such pretrial 
determination in the present case was left solely to the grand jury who 
received evidence only from the prosecutor. The absence of any compel-
ling reason justifying the discrimination against the appellant mandates 
this court to conclude that he, as well as other defendants, has a funda-
mental right to a pretrial preliminary examination of probable cause by a 
neutral magistrate. 
Relying on the case of Thiede v. Territory of Utah, 159 U.S. 
510 (1895), the respondents argue that an indictment, standing alone, 
establishes probable cause sufficient to bring the accused to trial . How-
ever, the Thiede decision was rendered before Utah achieved statehood 
and before the Utah Constitution was adopted. Article I, Section 13 of 
the Utah Constitution provides that persons charged by information or 
-6-
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indictment have a right to a preliminary examination by a magistrate 
unless such examination is waived. It would seem proper for this court 
to accept the language of the Constitution of the State of Utah rather than 
the 81-year-old TWede decision which was rendered before the Consti-
tution was adoptedc Reliance on the Utah Constitution mandates the con-
clusion that the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion for a 
preliminary examination of probable cause by a magistrate. 
Point IV 
AFTER AN INDICTMENT IS RETURNED AND 
AN ACCUSED IS ARRESTED, THERE IS NO 
REASON TO DENY A REQUEST TO TAKE 
DEPOSITIONS OF GRAND JURY WITNESSES. 
Respondents have failed to produce any valid reason to 
support the position that the appellant should be afforded pretrial dis-
covery rights inferior to those of a defendant in a civil case. At page 
20 of their brief, respondents contend that the secrecy of the grand jury 
would be destroyed if the appellant were permitted to depose grand jury 
witnesses. However, appellant's request for depositions was made 
after he had been indicted and arrested, at a time when no reason for 
secrecy exists. (See Point II of this reply brief.) Thus his request 
avoids any threat of destruction to the grand jury system. 
As noted on pages 23 and 24 of appellant's brief, at least 
four justices of this present court have agreed that a defendant in a 
criminal case should be granted equal if not superior pretrial discovery 
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rights to those enjoyed by a defendant in a civil matter. Such majority 
agreement with the appellant's position mandates a ruling that the lower 
court erred in denying his request to take depositions. 
CONCLUSION 
The authority for the respondents' arguments throughout 
their brief is antiquated to the degree of being inapplicable in the present 
case. Recent case law, including the Hensley decision, supra, indicates 
that the appellant's application for a writ of habeas corpus was his proper 
remedy due to his constitutional attack on the restraint of his liberty. 
The appellant's requests to obtain verbatim copies of transcripts and to 
take depositions in no way threatens the secrecy of the grand jury system 
as these requests were made after indictment and arrest . In light of the 
fact that no such threat has been made and due to the respondents' failure 
to provide any compelling reason justifying the denial of a preliminary 
examination by a magistrate, the appellant's restraint is illegal and in 
violation of the Utah Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L . HANSEN AND ASSOCIATES 
and D. FRANK WILKINS 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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